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Abstract—An increasing amount of mobility data is being col-
lected every day by different means, such as mobile applications
or crowd-sensing campaigns. This data is sometimes published
after the application of simple anonymization techniques (e.g.,
putting an identifier instead of the users’ names), which might
lead to severe threats to the privacy of the participating users.
Literature contains more sophisticated anonymization techniques,
often based on adding noise to the spatial data. However, these
techniques either compromise the privacy if the added noise is
too little or the utility of the data if the added noise is too strong.
We investigate in this paper an alternative solution, which builds
on time distortion instead of spatial distortion. Specifically, our
contribution lies in (1) the introduction of the concept of time
distortion to anonymize mobility datasets (2) Promesse, a protec-
tion mechanism implementing this concept (3) a practical study
of Promesse compared to two representative spatial distortion
mechanisms, namely Wait For Me, which enforces k-anonymity,
and Geo-Indistinguishability, which enforces differential privacy.
We evaluate our mechanism practically using three real-life
datasets. Our results show that time distortion reduces the
number of points of interest that can be retrieved by an adversary
to under 3 %, while the introduced spatial error is almost null
and the distortion introduced on the results of range queries is
kept under 13 % on average.
Keywords—location privacy; data publication; time distortion
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread adoption of location-aware devices such as
smartphones, GPS navigation systems or GPS-enabled watches
has dramatically increased the quantity of mobility data that is
being continuously collected. This data is either sent online by
the users when querying location-based services (e.g., finding
nearby restaurants, friends) or is collected by applications
and then published/sold offline to third parties (e.g., GPS
traces sold for marketing purposes) or as part of crowd-
sensing campaigns (e.g., publication of jogging/cycling traces,
publication of pictures with location metadata on Flickr).
However, collecting and sharing mobility data raises se-
rious privacy concerns. Among the known threats is the
extraction of users’points of interest [1] (or POIs), which can
be defined as places where individuals regularly spend some
time, e.g., home, work, a cinema or a mall. By studying
the semantics of these places, it is possible to infer sensitive
knowledge like religious or political preferences, for example
if an individual often goes to a worship place or a political
party’s headquarter. Learning users’ POIs can ultimately lead
to learn about their real identity with a good accuracy [2].
Mobility data can also be used as an input of next place
prediction algorithms, enabling to guess where users are likely
to be in the next hour [3] as well as in four years [4], which
opens the door to harmful threats such as house robbing.
Nevertheless, mobility data is still very valuable. Publish-
ing such information allows researchers to perform real-time
traffic predictions, to find out interesting mobility patterns or to
discover social and economic tendencies. A number of research
efforts have thus been carried out in the last few years to
protect users’ location privacy. While effective mechanisms
exist for the protection of privacy when a user opportunistically
sends her current location to a location-based service (e.g.,
by using two non-colluding servers [5]), it is still an open
issue to publish mobility traces of a set of users in a privacy-
preserving manner. The major challenge in the latter case is
due to the regularity of users’ mobility habits. Indeed, as users
go to the same places at similar times of the day/days of the
week, simple clustering techniques applied on published traces
allow to infer users’ POIs.
To address this issue, a classical solution is to alter user
locations (e.g., [6], [7]). However, according to the amount of
added noise, this may also alter the utility of the published
data. Indeed, the introduced spatial distortion may prevent the
exploitation of protected traces for some well-known use cases
such as transportation mode detection (e.g., [8]). An alternative
solution that one may think of is the adoption of time distortion
instead of spatial distortion. In this paper, we investigate this
alternative and introduce our main contribution, Promesse,
which is, at the best of our knowledge, the first mechanism
that aims at hiding users’ POIs by distorting time. Specifically,
Promesse hides users’ POIs by: (1) smoothing the users’ speed
along their trajectories and (2) blurring the start and end points
of these trajectories to make them less easily identifiable.
A preliminary version of this work has been presented
in [9]. We present in this paper a detailed version along with a
thorough evaluation. We practically study the effectiveness of
Promesse compared to two representative mechanisms relying
on spatial distortion, namely Wait For Me [10], which guar-
antees k-anonymity, and Geo-Indistinguishability [6], which
guarantees differential privacy. Our evaluation, performed us-
ing three real-life datasets, shows that the number of retrieved
POIs with Promesse is under 3 %, which is comparable to what
the other mechanisms can achieve. In the same time, Promesse
provides no spatial error, while the other mechanisms’ error
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ranges from 24 to 70,000 meters.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. We
first present related works in Section II before introducing
the problem statement in Section III. We then present our
mechanism in Section IV. We further present our experimental
evaluation in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper and
present our future research directions in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
There is a rich literature about privacy-preserving data
publication of mobility traces. We categorize existing work
depending on the privacy guarantee they offer.
k-anonymity. In 2002 Sweeney introduced the concept
of k-anonymity. The main idea behind this concept is that,
for each quasi-identifier of a published dataset, there must
be at least k persons with the same quasi-identifier. This
allows to hide each person among k − 1 other persons. k-
anonymity has been extended to the field of location privacy
with spatial cloaking [11]. In this context people report to be in
an approximate area instead of reporting their exact location.
By doing this they make their location indistinguishable among
all locations contained in their area (if an adversary has no
background knowledge) and they are anonymous among all
other persons in the same area.
When people move, they essentially move from one place
to another, which is often a POI. The list of these places can
been considered as a quasi-identifier, which can be protected
with a k-anonymity guarantee. Terrovitis et al. [12] presented
a model where they know the background knowledge of an
adversary and use it to suppress a set of locations from
trajectories, taking into account the impact both in terms of
privacy and utility. Yarovoy et al. [13] tackled the problem
of creating optimal anonymization groups for moving objects,
which unlike traditional databases may not be disjoint. How-
ever, these approaches tackle a slightly different problem than
ours. They are interested in anonymizing a sequence of POIs
and not in anonymizing whole trajectories of users, which is
what we want to do. Other mechanisms consider trajectories as
a whole instead of individual locations or places. Abul et al.
proposed Never Walk Alone [7], whose idea is to guarantee
that at every instant there is at least k users walking at a
given distance of the others, thus creating cylinders within
which users move. This mechanism has been later improved
by Wait for Me [10] (or W4M). The latter removes some
constraints about the input dataset and scales to large datasets.
Their mechanism was tested against two datasets, a synthetic
one and a real-life one. The approach was shown to perform
well with the synthetic dataset but having more difficulties to
maintain a correct utility with the real-life dataset.
Differential privacy. Differential privacy is a more recent
concept introduced by Dwork [14] defining a formal and
proven privacy guarantee. The idea is that an aggregate result
over a database should be almost the same whether or not
a single element is present inside the database. In other
words, the addition or removal of one single element shall
not change significantly the probability of any outcome of
aggregate functions. One manner to provide differential privacy
is by adding calibrated Laplacian noise to each component of
a query result.
Differential privacy has been used by Jiang et al. [15]
to protect ships’ trajectories. Endpoints of trajectories are
preserved while intermediate locations are altered. This results
in a large distortion of trajectories and consequently in a
difficult trade-off between privacy and utility. Andres et al. [6]
introduced the concept of Geo-Indistinguishability (or Geo-I)
which is a generalization of differential privacy specifically
suited for location privacy. They propose to achieve Geo-I
by adding a calibrated noise drawn from a two-dimensional
Laplace distribution. Two use cases are studied in their paper,
one of them being the the anonymization of statistical geolo-
cated datasets. We have previously studied this mechanism
in [16] and shown that it is not suitable to anonymize entire
mobility datasets, because POIs can still be retrieved. Chen et
al. [17] anonymized public transportation usage data, which
can be seen for each user as a sequence of places (metro/bus
stations) she went to. They built a method to anonymize
such data in a differentially private way and evaluated their
mechanism by studying the impact of anonymization on range
queries and sequential pattern mining. Like other k-anonymity
works, their mechanism is focused on the anonymization of
sequences of records. Acs et al. [18] proposed a mechanism
to anonymize spatio-temporal densities datasets, which reports
counts of active users within small areas for given time
windows. Such data can be obtained for instance from call
data records that are gathered by mobile phone operators.
The authors proposed an approach that adapts to the original
data in order to guarantee differential privacy with the highest
possible utility. Counting users is one interesting thing to do
with mobility data, but we want to publish entire trajectories
and allow more mining tasks to be performed.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We present in this section the privacy and utility objectives we
target in this paper.
A. Utility concerns
We aim at the publication of fine-grained and spatially
accurate mobility datasets. By fine-grained datasets we mean
a set of records, each one being a location (i.e., a point
on the Earth) associated with a (virtual) user identifier and
a timestamp. Indeed, publishing fine-grained datasets allows
analysts to freely implement their data mining tasks with the
tools and languages they want and run them on the published
data. Moreover, there are use cases where such datasets
are required. For example, researchers working on delay-
tolerant networks test their algorithms with real-life datasets
(e.g., [19]). Another example is the case of transportation
mode detection. In this context, state-of-the-art algorithms
need to extract a number of information from mobility traces
such as speed, acceleration [8] or proximity to rail lines/bus
stops [20], which is not possible using alternative solutions
such as interactive querying, where data analysts are restricted
to a pre-defined query language provided by the data owner
(e.g., [21]), or the publication of pre-aggregated datasets (e.g.,
[18]).
B. Privacy challenges
In terms of privacy, we focus on hiding the users’ POIs
that could be inferred by an attacker. As defined in [1], POIs
are important places that a user regularly visits and in which
she spends a given amount of time. POIs have been shown
to be very sensitive because they allow to infer knowledge
such as where one lives, her work occupation, her hobbies,
her political or religious preferences, etc. urther, it has been
shown in [22] that even the simple pair home/work can lead to
a re-identification of a large number of users. We hence focus
in this paper on the protection of users’ POIs that we assess
using a state-of-the-art POI extraction attack presented in [23].
C. The need of a new mechanism
State-of-the-art protection mechanisms suitable to publish
fine-grained mobility datasets in a privacy-preserving way
focus on spatial distortion, i.e., they alter the spatial component
of each record to protect the privacy of users. We present
in the next section an alternative solution based on temporal
distortion and analyse the pros and cons of each approach in
the rest of the paper.
IV. A TIME DISTORTION BASED MECHANISM
We begin by proposing definitions of concepts that will
be used in the remaining of this paper (Section IV-A), before
presenting our mechanism (Section IV-B).
A. Definitions
Physical and logical user. An individual, also called a
physical user, is a person with an identity (first name, last
name, social security number, etc.). A logical user (or user
for short), is a consistent source of mobility data coming from
a single physical user. A physical user can be associated with
many logical users (e.g., multiple anonymized traces can be
originated from a single physical user).
Location. A location is a point at the surface of the Earth.
It can be represented in many ways, like by a latitude and a
longitude or by a projection in cartesian coordinates. Locations
are elements of P and we consider that there is a suitable
function dX : P2 → R to compute the distance between two
locations.
Record. A record is the smallest indivisible piece of data
that can be collected. It represents the location of a user at a
specific time. More specifically, it is a triplet composed of (1) a
user identifier, linking a record to a specific user. Whereas
user identifiers could be anything, we suppose they do not
contain anything that could lead to the physical user’s identity.
This is why user identifiers are generally sequential or random
integers; (2) a timestamp, storing the date and time at which
the record was generated; and (3) a location, encoding the
spatial representation of the place at which the record was
generated. The set of all possible records being R, we use a
dotted notation to ease access to records’ members. For any
record r ∈ R, r.user refers to the user identifier, r.loc refers
to the location of the record and r.time refers to the timestamp
of the record.
Dataset. A consistent set of records forms a dataset. All
records inside a dataset usually come from a single collection
campaign and feature similar characteristics (e.g., the sampling
rate or the geographical area). The set of all possible datasets
being D, for any D ∈ D, D ⊂ R.
Mobility trace. A subset of a dataset that contains all
records belonging to a same user is called a mobility trace.
Each user of a dataset is associated with one single mobility
trace containing all her records. The set of all possible mobility
traces associated with user u is noted Tu, and hence for any
T ∈ Tu, T ⊂ R. There is a total order on Tu using the
chronological order, i.e., more formally, ∀a, b ∈ T 2u a ≤ b ⇔
a.time ≤ b.time.
Location-privacy protection mechanism. Datasets can
be modified to offer privacy guarantees by using a location-
privacy protection mechanism (or simply a protection mech-
anism). More formally it is defined as a function D −→ D
which produces a new dataset offering privacy guarantees from
an input dataset. Protected datasets are also referred to as
published datasets.
B. Speed smoothing
As pointed out in Section III, our objective in terms of
privacy protection is to hide users’ POIs. These correspond to
places where users stop and spend some time, before starting
again to move to another place. A trace can be viewed as
a list of POIs, that appear on visualized traces as clusters of
locations (as shown on Figure 1a), with transitions in between.
Our counter-measure to hide POIs is thus to enforce a constant
speed in the whole trace of a user, i.e., with speed smoothing.
If we can guarantee that speed is constant throughout a trace,
it becomes difficult for an adversary to spot where a user
stopped because there is no point at which she appears to
be stationary. Clues can still be obtained from background
knowledge (e.g. the probability is higher to stop in a park
that in the middle of a highway) but there will be no certainty
for an attacker (e.g. a user can either have just crossed the
park or had a picnic there). Moreover, we want to guarantee
that there is a constant duration and distance between two
successive records in a trace. This prevents an attacker from
inferring information by studying spatio-temporal intervals at
which traces have been sampled. Figure 1b shows the result
of speed smoothing applied to two mobility traces. From this
figure, we can see that the POIs of the users have been removed
and that records on each trace are regularly spaced. After this
step, two records remain unchanged in each trajectory: the
first and the last record. Because they are likely to be POIs
(e.g., a home), they need to be protected. Our solution is to
blur endpoints to reduce the precision around them and hence
protect users’ privacy around these places. Figure 1c shows
the effect of blurring endpoints.
We now present one implementation of the speed smooth-
ing protection mechanism, i.e., Promesse, depicted in Fig-
ure 2. This algorithm takes as input a mobility trace and
an  parameter. The first step of this algorithm, is to extract
regularly spaced locations, each being at a distance  from
the following one (lines 2-16). The larger , the better the
privacy guarantee, but the higher the information loss along the
trajectory. To perform this sampling, locations are interpolated
along segments joining known locations. This means that our
method is more suited for traces with a high sampling rate
(e.g., ten to thirty seconds between consecutive records). The
Interpolate function is not given here because its implementa-
tion depends on how locations are represented. After this, we
remove the first and last locations from the list (lines 22-23), in
Point of interest
Point of interest
Blurred endpoints
Blurred endpoints
(a) Original dataset.
Point of interest
Point of interest
Blurr d endpoints
Blurr d endpoints
(b) After enforcing a constant speed.
P int of interest
P int of interest
Blurre  endpoints
Blurre  endpoints
(c) After blurring endpoints.
Figure 1: Overview of Promesse.
order to help hiding endpoints that would otherwise be easily
guessed. More precisely, we reduce the precision by  around
there areas. If after this step there is not enough remaining
locations left to recreate a valid trace (i.e., two or less), we
simply discard the trace (lines 18-20). The second step is
then to assign to each of the previously sampled locations
a timestamp by uniformly distributing the duration of the
original trace (lines 25-32). The implementation of the full
Promesse protection mechanism is shown in lines 36-44. The
speed smoothing algorithm is independently applied to each
mobility trace of a dataset. The algorithm depicted here is
sequential but operations can be parallelized if necessary to
anonymize large datasets containing a large number of users.
From the above it appears that a variable that might have
an important impact on the results of Promesse is . This value
should be chosen according to the granularity of POIs that the
data owner wants to hide. Intuitively, we expect POIs whose
diameter is smaller than  to be hidden, where the diameter of
a POI refers to the diameter of the circular area where all the
records related to this POI fall. This parametrization question
is not unique to our mechanism. Indeed, differentially-private
mechanisms [14] or k-anonymous ones [24] must also be
parametrized according to the level of privacy to achieve.
V. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
We start by describing in Section V-A our experimental
settings (i.e., datasets, Promesse implementation and config-
uration as well as a description of the other studied mecha-
nisms). Then, we describe the evaluation of Promesse in terms
of privacy, utility and performance in Section V-B, V-C and
V-D, respectively.
A. Experimental settings
Datasets. We study the protection mechanisms using three
real-life datasets: the Cabspotting dataset [25], the Geolife
dataset [26] and the MDC dataset [27], [28]. Cabspotting
has been collected over a month by 536 taxis in the San
Francisco Bay Area. The entire dataset is composed of 11M
records. Geolife has been collected by Microsoft Research
Asia over four years and by 182 users. It is not restricted
to people during working hours but instead follows people
during their daily life. This dataset includes 25M records, but
Table I: Figures about datasets used in experiments
Metric Cabspotting Geolife MDC
Records 8,986,419 3,804,788 1,124,454
Traces 5,503 2,475 4,693
Avg trace duration 32h 44 min 3h 4 min 3h 15 min
Max trace duration 20 days 1 day 22h 20 days
Avg sampling rate 72s 7s 32s
is quite inconsistent: some people have been tracked during
the whole four years whereas others have only contributed
for a few hours. MDC has been collected between 2009 and
2011 around Lausanne, Switzerland and involves a total of
185 users, followed during their daily life. The entire dataset
is composed of 11M records containing location information.
We pre-processed our datasets to make all traces begin the
same day and removed entire days with no data. Then we only
kept the first 20 days of data, to have a dataset with a similar
duration for all users. We further performed another type of
pre-processing on the three datasets. We divided each trace
into individual parts, each one being a set of records with no
temporal gap between two consecutive records. Specifically,
a trace is divided into two parts when no record is logged
during four consecutive hours. Each part is then considered
as an independent trace associated with a new virtual user
identifier, no matter to which logical user it really belongs.
This pre-processing helps to preserve privacy, as it breaks the
correlation between multiple journeys of a same logical user.
We applied this pre-processing for all studied mechanisms to
allow a fair comparison. Final figures about datasets after the
pre-processing are summarized in Table I.
Implementation. Our mechanism is implemented in Java
8. To enable the reproduction of our experiments, the source
code of Promesse and datasets we use are available on our
website1. We ran our experiments on a single Debian virtual
machine having access to 8 Gb of RAM and 8 cores clocked
at 1.8 GHz each.
Configuration. We tested Promesse with various values
of the  parameter: 50 (only for Geolife and MDC, because
this value is impracticable for Cabspotting), 100, 200 and 500
1http://liris.cnrs.fr/privamov/publications/trustcom15
1: function SMOOTHSPEED(T ∈ Tu, )
2: points← {}, prev ← ∅
3: for curr ∈ T do
4: if prev = ∅ then
5: points← points ∪ {point}
6: prev ← curr.loc
7: else
8: d← dX (curr.loc, prev)
9: while d ≥ δ do
10: loc← INTERPOLATE(prev, curr.loc, )
11: points← points ∪ {(loc, curr.time)}
12: prev ← loc
13: d← dX (curr.loc, prev)
14: end while
15: end if
16: end for
17:
18: if |points| ≤ 2 then
19: return {} . Non protectable trace
20: end if
21:
22: remove first element of points
23: remove last element of points
24:
25: tmin ← minr∈points r.time
26: tmax ← maxr∈points r.time
27: interval← (tmax − tmin)/(|points| − 1)
28: output← {}, time← tmin
29: for point ∈ points do
30: output← output ∪ {(u, point.loc, time)}
31: time← time+ interval
32: end for
33: return output
34: end function
35:
36: function PROMESSE(D ∈ D, )
37: U ← {r.user | r ∈ D}
38: output← {}
39: for u ∈ U do
40: t← {r ∈ D | r.user = u}
41: output← output ∪ SMOOTHSPEED(t)
42: end for
43: return output
44: end function
Figure 2: Promesse implementation.
meters.
Other mechanisms studied. We compare Promesse with
two representative state-of-the-art mechanisms. The first one
is Geo-I [6], which is the latest approach offering differential
privacy guarantees to the users. We configure Geo-I with
various value of  (despite having the same name, their
parameter is not the same as ours and cannot be compared
with) that are similar to the ones authors of the paper consider
in their publications [6], [29]. For example,  = ln(4)/200
means that for two points in the radius of 200 meters, their
probability to be protected locations of the same original
location differ by at most 4. The lower , the more noise is
added and the stronger the privacy guarantee. We acknowledge
that Geo-I is not exactly designed for the publication of entire
datasets, but it is a representative mechanism that adds noise
to locations to protect them. The other mechanism we consider
is W4M [10], which enforces k-anonymity. We configure
W4M to use the LSTD distance, described in their paper,
that is shown to perform better with large datasets. Further,
we configure the mechanism with the following parameters:
δ = 200 meters, k = 2, Max_Trash = 10 % of the dataset’s
size and max_radius = 5000 meters. This means that at any
time, any two traces in the protected dataset are in a cylinder
that has a 200 meters diameter. Other parameters are default
ones suggested by the authors of this paper. We only study one
configuration of W4M because k = 2 is the minimum value
(results are worse when k increases [10]) and δ = 200m puts
it in a similar situation than Promesse, in addition to being
consistent with the value of ∆` we chose (cf. Section V-B).
B. Privacy evaluation
We evaluate the privacy effectively guaranteed to users
by running a POIs extraction attack on datasets protected by
Promesse, Geo-I and W4M. Using the result of an attack to
quantify privacy is an approach that has already been proposed
in [30]. POIs can be extracted using algorithms such as the
one proposed in [23]. We configure this algorithm to extract
POIs with a maximum diameter ∆` = 200 meters and a
minimum stay time ∆t = 15 minutes. To measure the privacy
leakage, we extract POIs from the dataset before and after
having applied a protection mechanism and whether the latter
match with the former. Specifically, we note P ∈ Pn a set of
POIs extracted from an original trace and P ′ ∈ Pn′ a set of
POIs extracted from a protected trace (POIs can be viewed as
simple locations).
Definition 1: The matching operation associates to each
location of a given set, the closest location in another set iff
its distance w.r.t. dX is lower than a threshold `:
match`(P, P
′) =
⋃
p′∈P ′
argmin
p∈P
{dX (p, p′)|dX (p, p′) ≤ `}.
Definition 2: The recall is the ratio between the number of
matching POIs retrieved from a protected dataset and the real
number of POIs:
recall`(P, P
′) =
|P ∩ match`(P, P ′)|
|P | .
Definition 3: The precision is the ratio between the number
of matching POIs retrieved from a protected dataset and the
total number of POIs retrieved:
precision`(P, P
′) =
|P ∩ match`(P, P ′)|
|P ′| .
Definition 4: The F-score is the harmonic mean of preci-
sion and recall:
fscore`(P, P
′) =
2× precision`(P, P ′)× recall`(P, P ′)
precision`(P, P ′) + recall`(P, P ′)
.
For conciseness, we only report on the F-score metric with
` = ∆`/2 = 100m, which takes into account both precision
and recall. We report on the average F-score across all traces in
each dataset in Table II. From this table, we can see that in the
Cabspotting dataset, POIs are always hidden with Promesse,
no matter the value of . With Geolife and MDC, we closely
reach our goal with  = 200m. This value of  was indeed
Table II: F-scores of POIs retrieval.
Protection mechanism Cabspotting Geolife MDC
Promesse,  = 50m - 17.22 % 13.91 %
Promesse,  = 100m 0 % 11.06 % 7.94 %
Promesse,  = 200m 0 % 2.27 % 1.01 %
Promesse,  = 500m 0 % 0 % 0 %
Geo-I,  = ln(10)/100 30.72 % 42.38 % 55.95 %
Geo-I,  = ln(6)/200 6.33 % 9.41 % 16.31 %
Geo-I,  = ln(4)/200 3.53 % 4.50 % 9 %
Geo-I,  = ln(2)/200 1.49 % 0.85 % 0.54 %
W4M, k = 2, δ = 200m 0 % 0 % 0 %
expected to be its optimal parametrization, given that with this
value we have  = ∆`. Still, the F-Score is close but not equal
to zero, most likely due to some edge cases. It is worth noting
that behind this low F-Score, we have in reality both a low
precision and a low recall. This means that very few POIs are
retrieved, and that they are lost inside many false positives.
Furthermore, we observe that W4M hides all POIs in the
three datasets, but this is a consequence of the great quantity
of noise that has to be added to enforce k-anonymity. Here the
privacy comes at the cost of a very degraded utility, as it will
be shown in Section V-C. Finally, retrieving POIs from the
Geo-I protected datasets is very dependent on the quantity of
noise that has been added. With lower values of , and hence
more privacy, retrieving POIs becomes very challenging. With
 = ln(2)/200, almost no POI is found, as with Promesse.
Weaker values of  allow many POIs to be retrieved, up to
an F-Score of 55 %. We stayed with a simple POIs extraction
routine, but risk is even higher if we enlarge the clustering
radius ∆` to adapt to Geo-I, as it has been shown in [16].
C. Utility evaluation
We evaluate the utility of the protected datasets with two
metrics: the spatial error and range queries as described below.
Spatial error. We compute the difference between two
traces by measuring the distance between each record in the
protected trace and its projection onto the original trace. We
consider original traces as polylines whose vertices are records.
This allows us to fill the gaps between records and project
points onto these polylines. The distance between a record
in the protected trace and its projection onto the original
trace represents the spatial error, i.e., the spatial inaccuracy
of a protection mechanism. Please note that we do not take
into account the error due to the interpolation between two
consecutive locations, which is what our mechanism actually
does. We consider the original trace to be precise enough to
allow interpolation without losing accuracy.
Table III: Spatial errors.
Protection mechanism Cabspotting Geolife MDC
Promesse, ∀ 0 m 0 m 0 m
Geo-I,  = ln(10)/100 24 m 45 m 52 m
Geo-I,  = ln(6)/200 50 m 120 m 140 m
Geo-I,  = ln(4)/200 62 m 156 m 183 m
Geo-I,  = ln(2)/200 113 m 325 m 378 m
W4M, k = 2, δ = 200m 13,046 m 69,676 m 19,222 m
We report about the average spatial error for all records in
each dataset in Table III. From this table, we observe that the
spatial error of Promesse is equal to zero for the three datasets.
Indeed, by construction, the only inaccuracy introduced by
Promesse is due to the interpolation between sampled records,
which shows to be negligible in this experiment. Geo-I instead
adds noise to locations, depending on its  parameter, which
results in an average error ranging from 24 to 378 meters on
the three datasets. This has to be compared with the average
error due to GPS measurements which is about 15-20 meters.
This means that at its weakest level of privacy, Geo-I is just a
little bit less precise than the error that could come from the
normal usage of a GPS. However, when the level of privacy
increases, the error can go as high as 378 meters, which
is enough to highly disturb data mining tasks, especially in
a dense urban environment. Finally, among the three tested
mechanisms, W4M is the one with the worst spatial error,
which is at least equal to 13,046 meters in our experiments.
This is due to the large amount of noise W4M introduces
to enforce k-anonymity. These results highlight the benefit of
a time distortion protection mechanism for use cases where
a high spatial accuracy is needed, which cannot be achieved
with the other mechanisms building on spatial distortion.
Range queries. A classical operation performed on pub-
lished datasets is range queries. A range query counts how
many unique (i.e., different) users cross an area during a time
window. Despite being simple, this operation can be employed
by many useful applications (e.g., traffic prediction, finding
popular places). To measure the utility related to range queries,
we use the range query distortion metric defined in [10].
Definition 5: The distortion associated with a range query
Q is the relative error between its result over the original
dataset D ∈ D and its result over a protected dataset D′ ∈ D:
distortionQ(D,D
′) =
|Q(D)−Q(D′)|
Q(D)
.
In our context, a range query is defined using two param-
eters: a time window and a geographical area. Because the set
of all range queries is infinite, we need to generate many range
queries with different time windows and areas centered around
different times and locations. Additionally, many range queries
are irrelevant for our experiments, because they concern areas
or times for which we have no data. This is why we use a
smart range query generator choosing randomly one record
in the evaluated original dataset and using it to generate a
query centered around this record with a random duration and
a random area. This ensures that Q(D) 6= 0 (and that our
distortion is always defined). Similarly to [10], we choose time
windows ranging from 2 hours to 8 hours and square areas
whose half-diagonals range from 500 to 5,000 meters.
We report about the average query distortion in Table IV,
which is the average distortion over 1,000 randomly generated
queries. Results show that Promesse has a query distortion
ranging from 6 % to 27 % for  = 200m. This means that
results of range queries have, on average, a relative error of
at most 27 %. Further, results show that we perform at least
71 % better than W4M with all our datasets. Once again,
the distortion with Geo-I is dependent on the value of . The
weakest value features almost no distortion (but also does
not protect POIs in a satisfactory way, cf. previous section).
Table IV: Range query distortions.
Protection mechanism Cabspotting Geolife MDC
Promesse,  = 50m - 15.14 % 25.4 %
Promesse,  = 100m 6.77 % 14.83 % 25.23 %
Promesse,  = 200m 6 % 15.1 % 27 %
Promesse,  = 500m 6.9 % 18.97 % 31.23 %
Geo-I,  = ln(10)/100 0.7 % 7.58 % 3.08 %
Geo-I,  = ln(6)/200 2.46 % 20.43 % 10.36 %
Geo-I,  = ln(4)/200 3.39 % 27.24 % 13.47 %
Geo-I,  = ln(2)/200 7.21 % 60.46 % 29.98 %
W4M, k = 2, δ = 200m 102 % 102 % 94 %
Intermediary values of  correspond to similar distortions than
with the optimal Promesse. Note that the range query distortion
metric is more sensitive with Geolife and MDC because counts
are way smaller than with Cabspotting, and therefore the effect
of missing one user is more important on the relative error. This
explains the larger difference of distortion between Geo-I and
Promesse on the Geolife and MDC datasets.
D. Performance evaluation
We also consider two non-functional metrics that can also
impact the usability of the protected datasets, i.e., the execution
time and the compression degree as described below.
Execution time. The execution time is the time taken by
the anonymization process to generate a new protected dataset.
We assume the original dataset is already stored in the file
system (e.g., a database or a distributed file system) and only
measure the time to generate and write the protected dataset in
a text file. We report about execution times in Table V. Because
execution times remain almost constant for the various config-
urations of Geo-I and Promesse, we do not report about subtle
variations depending on parameters. Geo-I and Promesse are
the fastest mechanisms because their algorithms are quite
simple. Geo-I independently adds noise to each record and
Promesse independently protects each trace, which enables
them to be efficient. W4M is the slowest mechanism because
of the complexity coming from the clustering of similar traces
that is the heart of this mechanism.
Table V: Execution times.
Protection mechanism Cabspotting Geolife MDC
Promesse 210 s 25 s 15 s
Geo-I 147 s 64 s 21 s
W4M 605 min 70 min 37 min
Compression. In a general context, the anonymized dataset
can have a different size than the original dataset. It can
be smaller, if records have been deleted, or larger, if fake
records have been added. Producing datasets that are orders
of magnitude larger than the original ones greatly decreases
their usability, because the time needed to load and query them
increases accordingly, while much smaller ones can introduce
information losses (that could be quantified with the previous
utility metrics).
Definition 6: We define the compression degree as the ratio
between the size of a protected dataset D′ ∈ D and the size
of the non-empty original dataset D ∈ D:
compression(D,D′) =
|D′|
|D| .
Table VI: Compression degrees.
Protection mechanism Cabspotting Geolife MDC
Promesse,  = 50m - 51 % 206 %
Promesse,  = 100m 369 % 25 % 101 %
Promesse,  = 200m 177 % 12 % 48 %
Promesse,  = 500m 64 % 4 % 18 %
Geo-I, ∀ 100 %
W4M, k = 2, δ = 200m 106 % 76 % 99 %
Experimental results for the compression are shown in
Table VI. Results show that because Cabspotting has a coarser
sampling rate than Geolife, for small values of  the protected
dataset is much larger than the original one with Promesse.
Conversely the Geolife dataset protected with Promesse is
much smaller than the original one, the original dataset having
been collected with a very high sampling rate (average sam-
pling rate is 7 seconds, cf. Table I). W4M and Geo-I both
have almost no effect on the size of the produced dataset.
This metric is interesting because it shows that for Promesse,
some values of  are impracticable, resulting in too huge
datasets (this is why we do not experiment with Cabspotting
at  = 50m). But it also shows that it is possible to reduce
the size of a dataset with a high sampling rate without losing
"too much" information (cf. range query distortion).
E. Summary of the study
From the results presented in this section, we conclude that
time distortion seem to be a promising alternative to spatial
distortion for the privacy-preserving publication of mobility
datasets. Indeed, on the three datasets we studied, our proposed
Promesse mechanism parametrized with  = 200m hides
almost all users’ POIs, while keeping the spatial accuracy very
high. Temporal distortion has though an impact on metrics
for which time is important, e.g., range queries. Nevertheless,
Promesse still offers a distortion varying from 6 % to 27 %
according to the sparsity of dataset, which is comparable to
Geo-I and way better than W4M. Furthermore, Promesse is
simple to parametrize because there is only one parameter 
to set, whose meaning is clear: it represents the granularity of
POIs to protect. Obviously, among the many use cases that
data analysts may want to implement, there shall be some
that require a high temporal accuracy, which Promesse cannot
provide. In this case, Geo-I may still be a better candidate. Our
goal in this paper was to introduce another way to anonymize
mobility data, that takes the opposite direction of actual state-
of-the-art protection mechanisms and to practically study its
effectiveness.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented Promesse, a new protection
mechanism to anonymize mobility datasets. Its novelty resides
in the fact that it distorts time instead of distorting location,
which allows it to have a better utility than representative
state of the art mechanisms. Privacy evaluation shows that,
when configured appropriately, Promesse resists POI discovery
attacks similarly to Geo-I, which enforces differential privacy.
W4M, which enforces k-anonymity, still performs better, but
at the cost of a very decreased utility. Finally, Promesse is
fast, as it can anonymize a dataset of 9M records in less than
four minutes. From our study, we conclude that time distortion
anonymization is a promising alternative to existing spatial
ones, particularly for use cases where a high spatial accuracy
is required. In our future work, we plan to improve the
implementation of our algorithm by producing more realistic
traces without impacting the privacy guarantees.
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